Friday, September 20, 2013

PROSECUTOR'S USE OF PRE-CHARGE SUBPOENA POWER

Where no charges have been filed, a prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, including the target of investigations, pursuant to Ind. Code § 33-39-1-4.  However, if those witnesses invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor cannot petition for use immunity and compel them to testify without first filing charges or convening a grand jury.  See In re S.H., 984 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 2013)(decided March 27, 2013.

In this case, soon after S.C. gave birth at home, the father (S.H.) took S.C. and the infant to the hospital because S.C. was bleeding and the infant had multiple puncture wounds.  The prosecutor petitioned for subpoenas to compel the parents to testify about the circumstances of the infant's birth, but the trial court granted the parents' motion to quash the subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds. The trial court then erroneously granted the State's request to grant use immunity to the parents and ordered them to testify. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings.


CONSEQUENCES OF DUI CONVICTION

In Indiana, a driver whose blood-alcohol content (B.A.C.) registers at or higher than 0.08 is subject to at least a Class C misdemeanor. A B.A.C. of 0.15 or higher or driving while intoxicated is subject to at least a Class A misdemeanor and increased to a Class D felony if the driver had a passenger younger than 18 in the vehicle. Where the arrest is made and other factors determine whether jail time is involved. 

A subsequent arrest and conviction will result in an automatic five-day jail sentence, and two prior convictions mean a mandatory 10-day sentence. Some Indiana counties impose a jail sentence for a first-time conviction. The scope of the consequences and the repercussions for a first-time offender is broader than one might expect.

A driver who fails a chemical test will face a minimum 90-day license suspension, but driving privileges can be suspended up to 180 days. Those who refuse a Breathalyzer test can face a one-year suspension. Indiana allows some first-time offenders to apply for probationary driving privileges, but only after a 30-day suspension. The court may require the installation of an ignition interlock device, which tests blood-alcohol level before the car can be started.

There are employment consequences. Many lose their jobs because of the license suspension. Employers who hire workers in clinical settings are increasingly rejecting anyone with a DWI charge, and anyone whose job requires a commercial driver’s license is likely to face termination.

A common requirement in DUI cases is mandatory counseling for substance abuse, at the offender’s expense. The offender also must sign a form acknowledging a counselor can share information with the court.

There are significant financial implications associated with a DUI arrest.  In addition to attorney fees, convicted persons must pay court costs, fines and alcohol countermeasures fee. The costs continue with counseling expenses and, in some cases, drug testing ordered as a condition of probation. If a court approves a probationary license with an ignition interlock device, the driver bears those costs.

Last but not least, the driver has to consider auto insurance. Although a DWI conviction will not inherently cause insurance rates to rise, its effect on a driver’s record makes it necessary to buy high-risk insurance. Not all companies offer it, and it comes at great expense. In addition, a license suspension triggers requirements set by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles for reinstatement, with fees attached.

U.S. SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS WARRANTLESS SWAB TO IDENTIFY ARRESTEES

In Maryland v. King, a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures did not prohibit law enforcement from collecting DNA samples from suspects arrested for serious crimes. The majority of the court concluded that taking and analyzing check swabs for DNA to help identify arrestees is like fingerprinting, minimally intrusive and a reasonable police booking procedure under the Fourth Amendment. In dissent, Justice Scalia said the Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis to believe they committed the crime. “I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection,” Scalia wrote.

Those in support of this opinion see the case as an important weapon in the fight against crime, while critics see the case as a significant infringement on privacy and Fourth Amendment freedoms.


PROBATION/PAROLE CONDITIONS--SOCIAL NETWORKING

In Harris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), the court of appeals held that Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(a)(7), which requires disclosure of email addresses, instant messaging, and chat room user names that the sex offender registrant uses or intends to use, does not impose a burden on registrant's First Amendment freedom to speak anonymously and does not contravene his right to free expression as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.  This registration requirement does not restrict a defendant's ability to use email, “nor does it limit his use of social networking websites, instant messaging or chat room platforms.” 

However, the court also held that Ind. Code § 35-42-4-12, which prohibits registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, or chat programs that the offender knows allows a person who is less than eighteen years of age to access or use the website or program, is unconstitutional as applied to Harris, who is a sexually violent predator.  Though content neutral, the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the State's legitimate interest in protecting children from harmful online communications.  And the State already criminalized illicit expression with minors under child solicitation and inappropriate communication with child statutes. See Doe v. Marion County Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). The State failed to show that the social networking medium possess qualities allowing the Court to conclude that the substantive evil contemplated by Ind. Code § 35-42-4-12 is created by the medium itself, which would justify a complete ban on expression.  Harris, 985 N.E.2d at 880.

The court reversed Harris’ sex offender internet offense but affirmed his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. Judge Crone, concurring in result with a separate opinion, noted that in Doe, the Seventh Circuit found Ind. Code § 35-42-4-12 unconstitutional on its face and the protections of Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 9 "are at least equal to if not greater than those of the First Amendment."




WARRANTLESS USE OF PARCEL WIRE INSIDE HOME VIOLATED FOURTH AMENDMENT


In State v. Lagrone, 985 N.E.2d 66 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), police violated the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure when they used a parcel wire to monitor a package of marijuana once Lagrone had carried it into his home.  Due to that violation, warrantless entry into Lagrone's home was not justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment because under Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011), such entry to prevent destruction of evidence is allowed only where the police did not create the exigency by engaging in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.    

The installation of the GPS device and the parcel wire into the package Lagrone picked up from a hotel did not violate the Fourth Amendment because any privacy interest Lagrone had in the package was lost when United Parcel Service (UPS) opened the package on its premises.  Nor did police monitoring of the GPS device to track the package en route to Lagrone's home violate the Fourth Amendment, because officers also tracked Lagrone on the highway visually. But the monitoring of the parcel wire to determine when the package was opened constituted a search of Lagrone's home. And information obtained from the parcel wire after the package was inside Lagrone's home, i.e., that the package had been opened, could not have been observed from outside the home. As such, the receipt of that information via the parcel wire without a warrant violated Lagrone’s Fourth Amendment rights. And under King (above) the police cannot use the exigent circumstances exception to justify a forced warrantless entry into the home, based on the electronic signal from the parcel wire located inside the home, without having first obtained a warrant.



REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP A CAR BASED ON REAR WINDOW TINT

Indiana’s Window Tint Statute, I.C. 9-19-19-4(c), prohibits operation of a motor vehicle that has windows tinted in such a way that "the occupants of the vehicle cannot be easily identified or recognized through [those] window[s] from outside the vehicle.” In Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 2013), a police officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he believed the window tint on Erving Sanders’ Chevrolet Suburban was so dark that he could not "clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside."  The officer's belief that the window tint on Sanders’ rear window violated the Window Tint Statute was later invalidated through inspection of the Suburban by Sanders’ expert. Distinguishing Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), the Indiana Supreme Court noted that “although the officer was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory violation occurred.” Thus, the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Sanders’ Suburban and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress.


INDIANA'S NEW EXPUNGEMENT LAW

People deserve a fresh start or a second chance. So Indiana law regarding previous convictions and how they blemish a person’s record drastically changed on July 1, 2013. The new expungement law marks the first time Indiana has allowed crimes such as driving while intoxicated and drug dealing to be erased by the courts. The goal is to remove the crimes from public background-check engines used by employers so that the offense doesn't prevent a rehabilitated ex-offender from finding a job. The new law keeps potential employers from using the conviction against you in hiring/promoting decisions. Further, the new law punishes employers for contempt of court if job applicants are rejected because of expunged records. Police officers would still be able to view the person's criminal record.

Those petitioning the court to have their records expunged would have to show they've stayed out of trouble since their conviction, and must have successfully completed the entire sentence.  Most of the crimes that could be expunged are nonviolent. Convictions for sex crimes, federal offenses, out-of-state crimes and misconduct of a public official would not be eligible to be erased by the new law.  Certain other conditions must be met, including time frames and fees. 

Some highlights of the new expungement law:

  • Provides for the expungement (sealing) of criminal records in situations where there was an arrest but no conviction or where a conviction was overturned on appeal. The person seeking to expunge an arrest record must petition the criminal court to review his or her case but does not have to pay a filing fee.
  • If granted, expungement will seal (not destroy) records in court files, the department of corrections and the bureau of motor vehicles, and the state police, and with anyone who treated or provided services to the applicant under a court order.
  • Each individual gets one expungement request in his/her lifetime.  However, the statute is silent as to how many times one may seek to seal arrest records. The expungement petition must be brought in the county where the conviction took place.  If you have multiple convictions, the request should be brought in a single petition. If you have convictions in multiple counties, the petitions in each county must all be brought within one year, and that will be considered a single request.
  • For arrest records, misdemeanors, and class D Felonies, the expungement petition “shall” be granted if the individual meets the requirements called for in the statute.  No need to convince the judge that granting the expungement is a good idea.  For more serious crimes, the court “may” enter such an order and for the most serious of eligible crimes, the prosecutor’s consent must be obtained.
  • The new law also suggests language for use in all Indiana employment Applications.  A prospective employee may be questioned about a previous criminal record only in terms that exclude expunged convictions or arrests such as: “Have you ever been arrested or convicted of a crime that has not been expunged by a court?”



Tuesday, April 9, 2013

DOG AT YOUR FRONT DOOR IS A SEARCH

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ability of police to use a dog to sniff around the outside of a home for illegal drugs that might be inside. By a 5-4 vote, the court in Florida v. Jarnines held a government's use of trained police dogs to investigate a home and its immediate surroundings was a "search" subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. This decision could make it harder for police to use trained dogs to detect drugs without first obtaining warrants. The Court’s opinion resolved the Fourth Amendment question solely on property rights grounds, holding that bringing a dog to conduct a forensic search on someone’s porch constitutes a trespass at common law. The Court’s majority opinion found it unnecessary to decide whether the dog sniff also violated the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, under this decision, when the police trespass onto private property to conduct a search, the Fourth Amendment applies regardless of whether the trespass also invades someone’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

In 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals likewise held that the Indiana Constitution requires reasonable suspicion to conduct a dog sniff of a private residence. See Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009).

While the general public, including the police, generally have the right to approach a house’s front door (for example, to leave a flier or ask the occupant to answer a question), that license does not include an invitation to bring a dog onto the porch to search for drugs. Furthermore, although a police officer’s initial entry onto an individual’s property may be permissible, they must limit their visit to areas that can reasonably be viewed as open to them for legitimate police business and they cannot remain on a person’s property after it becomes clear to them that the purpose for their visit cannot be properly fulfilled. See, for example, Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). It has been held to be unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution for police to tour a person’s property to see if anyone was home after no one responded to their knocking on the front door. Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001).

But dog alerts on vehicles are not given as much protection 

It is well-settled that people in their automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy, thus a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005); Gibson v. State, 886 N.E.2d 639 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (art. 1 § 11). Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida v. Harris unanimously ruled that drug sniffing dogs can provide the probable cause needed to allow a police officer to conduct a search of the vehicle, and that records of the alerting dog's field performance may sometimes be relevant but should be considered in the context of all evidence related to probable cause.

However, the dog sniff may not significantly increase the duration of traffic stops. The State has the burden to show that the time for the lawful traffic stop was not increased due to the canine sweep. See, for example, Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). Furthermore, the Indiana Court of Appeals has held that police may not detain a passenger in order to get a drug-sniffing dog without reasonable suspicion. Regardless of whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the motorist in the first place, if the reasonable suspicion has dissipated, further detention is illegal. See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 722 N.E.2d 881 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000).

PROTECTED PERSON CANNOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCOMPLICE FOR VIOLATING A NO-CONTACT ORDER

In Indiana, a violation of a no-contact order issued as a condition of pretrial release
constitutes a misdemeanor offense of invasion of privacy. See Ind. Code 35-46-1-
15.1(5). A separate statute makes clear that an invitation by the protected person “does
not waive or nullify an order for protection.” Ind. Code 34-26-5-1. The Indiana Court of
Appeals recently decided for the first time that a protected person could not be charged
as an accomplice for invasion of privacy by inviting the respondent to make contact. See
Patterson v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012). Following an Ohio Supreme
Court case, the Court of Appeals concluded, “Protection orders are about the behavior
of the respondent and nothing else. How or why a respondent finds himself at the
petitioner’s doorstop is irrelevant. To find appellant guilty of complicity would be to
criminalize the irrelevancy.”

INDIANA’S FORFEITURE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO FRAUD OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

After Michael Curtis pled guilty to fraud for selling pirated movies out of his truck, a trial
judge erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment following the forfeiture of his
truck. The forfeiture was based on the assumption that the content of the pirated movies
sold out of Curtis's truck constituted "stolen..or converted property" pursuant to Indiana’s
forfeiture statute, Ind. Code ' 34 24 1 1(a)(1)(B). However, copyright infringement
does not constitute theft under established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 87 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985). Furthermore, the
statute clearly allows forfeiture in cases of theft or conversion but says nothing about
copyright infringement or... fraud. As forfeiture of his truck was not authorized by
statute, Curtis established extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. See Curtis v.
State, 981 N.E.2d 625 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013).

TRAFFIC STOPS BASED ON DRUNK DRIVING TIPS

In State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011), the Indiana Supreme Court held that
a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on a concerned citizen's
tip of a possibly intoxicated driver. The tipster identified himself, provided a telephone
number to the 911 dispatch officer and reported that he had been following a driver of
a blue Volkswagen who had been driving erratically and was going to "kill somebody."
The caller told the 911 operator the vehicle just pulled into a BP Gas Station but he
was unable to get a license plate number. Within 90 seconds, an officer arrived at the
gas station, observed the blue Volkswagen backing out of parking space and stopped
Renzulli.

The court reiterated its belief that “there may well be greater indicia of reliability in
the report of [a] "concerned citizen" as distinguished from [a] "professional informant."
Regardless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the concerned citizen in this case
supplied sufficient information to establish reasonable suspicion to support the officer's
investigatory stop (i.e., make/color of vehicle at time of night with minimal traffic, and
almost immediate response/arrival at the scene by the police). The Court held that the
circumstances of this case warranted an immediate response by the police for the safety
of the general public, as well as for the safety of Renzulli herself.